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THE ANTIDOTE TO ZOMBIE FORECLOSURES:
HOW BANKRUPTCY COURTS SHOULD ADDRESS THE
ZOMBIE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
ABSTRACT
Bankrupt homeowners across the United States continue to struggle because of the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Although zombie foreclosures present
a significant issue for individuals who filed for bankruptcy during the last few
years, there is no satisfactory legal remedy. The Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy courts may offer an overlooked solution to the problem. Due to flexibility within bankruptcy courts, bankruptcy judges have a greater degree of discretion within certain situations to fulfill their equitable powers. Bankruptcy
judges can take the realities of the debtor’s circumstances into account in ways
that state and federal courts cannot. This Comment’s recommendations
demonstrate the need for both courts and Congress to reconsider the Bankruptcy Code as a solution to zombie foreclosures. With a few amendments, the
Bankruptcy Code should be able to help alleviate the zombie foreclosure problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Markets across the United States suffered as a result of the 2008 recession.
Perhaps outside the job market, the housing market was the most acutely affected. In the years leading up to the recession, hundreds of thousands of
Americans received mortgages despite not meeting the underwriting requirements to receive such loans due to questionable mortgage securities created by
a variety of banking institutions.1 The resultant “housing meltdown” triggered
the financial crisis.2 While this meltdown occurred in 2008, the effects are still
felt around the country as properties are foreclosed upon, or remain in limbo.
Those that remain in limbo are often called zombie foreclosures.3 The term
“zombie foreclosure” refers to “when a lender goes through all the motions of
foreclosing on a property, but fails to take the final step of recording the foreclosure trustee’s deed that transfers legal title from the borrower to the foreclosing lender.”4 Zombie foreclosures damage communities, home sale prices,
and the debtor’s fresh start.5 Several news articles describe how zombie fore-

1 Forty-nine state attorneys general and the federal government reached a historic settlement for more
than $50 billion with the five largest mortgage services providers. About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-FED.
NAT’L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited Feb.
15, 2016). Through significant punitive damages, the United States government and related parties recognize
clearly that the public needs relief from the challenges created by financial fraud with mortgages leading up to
the financial crisis. See Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for
Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-settlement-financialfraud-leading. Similarly, a number of States brought actions against the banks based on a similar rationale to
address the financial fraud against the American public. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.
3:13-cv-00446-MOC-DSC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83566 (W.D.N.C. June 19, 2014).
2 Danielle Douglas, Justice Department, Bank of America Remain at Odds over Mortgage Settlement,
WASH. POST (July 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/justice-department-bank-ofamerica-remain-at-odds-over-mortgage-settlement/2014/07/16/8d4b02a0-0d14-11e4-8341b8072b1e7348_story.html; see also Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 734
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (referring to this time period and related events as “[t]he perfect storm of the ‘Great
Recession’”).
3 Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The Latest Foreclosure Horror: The Zombie Title, REUTERS (Jan. 11,
2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-usa-foreclosures-zombies-idUSBRE9090G
920130110.
4 Harvey S. Jacobs, House Lawyer: New Federal Loan Guidelines Ease the Sting of ‘Zombie Foreclosures,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/house-lawyer-new-federalloan-guidelines-ease-the-sting-of-zombie-foreclosures/2014/09/25/bd45bec4-4003-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_
story.html.
5 See, e.g., Judith Fox, The Foreclosure Echo: How Abandoned Foreclosures Are Re-Entering the Market Through Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 25, 41 n.72 (2013); Allison Fitzgerald, “Zombie”
Homes Haunt Florida Neighborhoods, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 15, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/
item/26189-zombie-homes-haunt-florida-neighborhoods.
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closures become blights within municipalities and how the numbers of
“blights” continue to increase in a number of areas nationwide.6 Zombie foreclosures not only cause eyesores for communities, but they additionally affect
other neighboring property values, are often surrounded by crime, and cause
severe fragmentation within already struggling neighborhoods.7 These difficulties are not isolated incidents, but are pervasive throughout America. The complicated reality of the mortgage foreclosure crisis has been acknowledged in
news articles, as well as by Congress.8
Zombie foreclosures represent very real challenges and concerns to debtors,
creditors, and communities. As case law illustrates, these challenges include
continuing liability for properties and assets that debtors believe they are no
longer legally responsible for, and vacant, dilapidated houses within neighborhoods throughout a community. These results are unfair to the individual debtors and communities.9 Attorney General Schneiderman aptly summed up the
collective unfairness when he stated “[l]eaving zombie properties to rot is unfair to municipalities and unfair to neighbors, who pay their taxes and maintain
their homes . . . .”10
Given the serious nature of these challenges, it is necessary for the Bankruptcy Code to be amended or for bankruptcy courts to read the provisions in a
broader fashion as they relate to zombie foreclosure. This Comment will ex6

Fitzgerald, supra note 5 (stating that these blights are associated with drug dealers, squatters, and devalued properties); see Mark Fahey, Where Zombie Foreclosures Are Making Comeback, CNN MONEY (Feb.
6, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/06/real_estate/zombie-foreclosure/.
7 See James J. Kelly, Jr., A Continuum in Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Market, 33 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 120 (2013) (addressing briefly the role zombie foreclosures play in further complicating “who had the authority and responsibility for maintaining [the vacant lots]”).
8 See generally Strengthening the Housing Market and Minimizing Losses to Taxpayers: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp. & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 1 (2012) (“The hearing . . . will examine actions that can strengthen the mortgage market at no or minimal cost to taxpayers, including mortgage modifications, such as principal reduction or shared appreciation,
reducing distressed property sales, and increasing demand and people’s ability to buy homes.”); Saving Our
Neighborhoods from Foreclosures: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp. & Cmty. Dev. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Saving Our Neighborhoods] (statement of Sen. Robert Menendez, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Hous., Transp. & Cmty. Dev.) (stating that the purpose of the hearing is to determine “how we save our neighborhoods from the problems of
foreclosure, how we can help homeowners deal with foreclosure and communities deal with the blight of foreclosed properties”).
9 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eric T. Schneiderman, A.G. Schneiderman to Submit
Expanded Legislation to Address Growing Problem of “Zombie Properties” (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-submit-expanded-legislation-address-growing-problem%E2%80%9Czombie-properties.
10 Id.
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plore a number of sections within the Bankruptcy Code that may offer potential methods to resolve the zombie foreclosure dilemma. This Comment will
discuss bankruptcy case law that exists on zombie foreclosures and legislative
commentary surrounding the foreclosure crisis.
There are two rationales that serve to justify why the bankruptcy courts
need to rethink current interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code. First, the debtor’s perspective is a rationale that stems from the main bases for bankruptcy
law: the fresh start and fairness to creditors. Second, the community interest
presents courts with an alternative rationale to support amending the way bankruptcy courts use their powers to address zombie foreclosures.
Over the years, the tenets underlying the bankruptcy system have been consistently clear despite changes to the Bankruptcy Code.11 As Justice Stevens
acknowledged in a 2006 opinion, “[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”12
Similarly, along with this interest in the debtor’s fresh start, bankruptcy
laws have demonstrated an identifiable concern for creditors.13 Specifically,
“the Court has long recognized that a chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws is
‘to secure a prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of
all bankrupts within a limited period.’”14 According to a House Committee
Report, “preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.”15
After considering the larger policy ramifications and the ever-increasing
hardships of the national mortgage foreclosure crisis, it is time to determine an
alternative venue for debtors to address zombie foreclosures. Bankruptcy
courts arguably offer a unique venue to identify a resolution to zombie foreclosures and the subsequent vacant lots across the United States. Bankruptcy
courts differ from other courts because judges under the Bankruptcy Code are
given greater levels of flexibility that allow them more wiggle room within
their decision making process than other federal judges. In a recent bankruptcy
case out of the Western District of North Carolina, In re Rose, the court at11

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 286–87 (1991)).
13 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966).
14 Id. at 328–29 (1966) (quoting Ex parte City Bank of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 292, 312 (1845)).
15 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
177–78 (1977)).
12
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tempted to address the Debtor’s Motion for Authority to Transfer Real Property to Secured Creditor by Quitclaim Deed.16 The facts of the case are similar to
many zombie foreclosure stories across the country, and requests similar to the
one at issue “are becoming more and more common.”17 Given the prevalence
of similar cases, bankruptcy courts need to be able to offer debtors an alternative path to a resolution.
The community interest basis of analysis highlights the public policy challenges underlying zombie foreclosures. Given the financial and social difficulties posed by vacant lots associated with zombie foreclosures, bankruptcy
courts need to find a way to address the issues. For policy reasons in addition
to reinforcement of key bankruptcy tenets (the debtor’s fresh start and fairness
to creditors), bankruptcy courts offer a readily available forum that, with slight
changes, could potentially resolve the ever-growing problem of zombie foreclosures.
This Comment will offer real world possibilities for bankruptcy courts to
consider when faced with a zombie foreclosure. Beyond pointing out relevant
sections and interpretations the bankruptcy courts should employ when making
decisions, this Comment will also address potential amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that could settle the debates around the usage of certain sections in
the future. This Comment will demonstrate that zombie foreclosures are a
problem that needs to be addressed—the time has come.
I. BACKGROUND
Within the Bankruptcy Code, the present definitions of key terms acutely
impact the outcome for a debtor faced with a zombie foreclosure. Many of these sections are discussed at length in bankruptcy cases such as In re Rose.18
The specific way each of these terms ties into the Bankruptcy Code will be
discussed at length during the Analysis section of this Comment.
A. “Zombie” Foreclosures
Zombie foreclosures occur on all sorts of property. The focus of this Comment, however, is on the zombie foreclosures on residential properties within

16
17
18

512 B.R. 790, 792 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
Id.
Id.
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chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.19 While zombie foreclosures can occur with
commercial real estate, residential zombie foreclosures pose greater issues to
communities and individual debtors.
Outlining the usual steps involving a mortgage that is discharged in a confirmed chapter 13 plan aids in understanding the ramifications of zombie foreclosures. Depending on the state, there are judicial and non-judicial foreclosures.20 Roughly forty percent of states only offer judicial foreclosures and
sixty percent are non-judicial foreclosure states.21 For judicial foreclosure
states, “the court governs the foreclosure process from default to final sale.”22
During foreclosure through a confirmed chapter 13 plan, in a judicial foreclosure state, the bankruptcy court agrees to lift the automatic stay so that the
creditor can initiate a foreclosure proceeding.23 Non-judicial foreclosure states
do not involve the court in foreclosures.24
From the perspective of the debtor, zombie foreclosures are the “plight of
people who walked away from their homes not realizing that their names remained on the deed and that they were financially liable for taxes and other
bills related to the abandoned property.”25 Zombie foreclosures affect the debtor’s ability to move forward after bankruptcy and the landscape of the community surrounding the property at issue.26
As a result of the mortgage crisis and subsequent housing crash, zombie
foreclosures have become a prevalent problem across America.27 The foreclosure crisis shows up in Congressional reports and discussions as early as

19 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“Chapter 13 authorizes an individual with regular income to obtain a discharge after the successful completion of a payment plan approved by
the bankruptcy court. . . . [and] the debtor retains possession of his property.”). See generally ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS (6th ed. 2009).
20 See Sarah Trevino, Comment, Avoiding the Avoid: Re-Securing the Mortgage Lender Post-BFP, 31
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 175, 194–95 (2014).
21 See id. at 194 n.130, 195 n.136.
22 Id. at 194 (2014).
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); In re Rose, 512 B.R. 790, 793 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
24 See Trevino, supra note 20, at195–96.
25 Barbara Liston, More than 300,000 Homes are Foreclosed “Zombies,” Study Says, REUTERS (Mar. 28,
2013, 4:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-usa-housing-zombies-idUSBRE92R0YQ2013
0328.
26 Id.
27 See id.
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2008,28 and began to appear frequently in mass media in 2013.29 From the
community perspective, zombie foreclosures lead to a number of problems, including how communities in crisis deal with the very complex realities of vacant homes, including “[s]quatters, crime, declining property values, and ultimately, demolition.”30
B. Congressional Commentary on the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis
The Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts has
acknowledged the difficulties state and federal courts face when addressing
zombie foreclosure cases.31 Some subcommittees have previously considered
bankruptcy courts as a possible venue to resolve these difficulties.32 In particular, the role of bankruptcy courts can be seen in subcommittee hearings that
dealt with other challenges that existed as a result of the mortgage foreclosure
crisis, rather than zombie foreclosures explicitly.33 While the Loss Mitigation
Program addresses a different aspect of the crisis, it demonstrates the unique
role bankruptcy courts could play. The Loss Mitigation Program came up
when the subcommittee actively revisited bankruptcy concepts after more than
a year had passed since a previous hearing on bankruptcy modifications, which
failed to effectively relieve the nationwide foreclosure crisis.34 During the second hearing, Judge Martin Glenn of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York talked about the Loss Mitigation Program created and
adopted by his district as of January 2009, which followed the same model as

28 Restoring the American Dream: Solutions to Predatory Lending and the Foreclosure Crisis: Field
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008).
29 See Les Christie, Zombie Foreclosures: Borrowers Hit with Debts That Won’t Die, CNN MONEY,
(Feb. 22, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/20/real_estate/zombie-foreclosures/; Conlin, supra
note 3; Scott Gunnerson, When Owners Walk, ‘Zombie’ Homes Become Nuisance, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2013,
3:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/09/01/foreclosed-homes-zombietitles/2753385/; Investopedia, What Homeowners Need to Know About Zombie Titles, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2013,
2:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2013/01/29/what-homeowners-need-to-know-aboutzombie-titles/.
30 Catherine Curan, Crumbling Foreclosed Houses Haunting Metro Area, N.Y. POST (Sept. 20, 2014,
11:39 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/09/20/crumbling-foreclosed-houses-haunting-metro-area/.
31 Mandatory Mediation Programs: Can Bankruptcy Courts Help End the Foreclosure Crisis?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of theS. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010)
[hereinafter Mandatory Mediation Programs].
32 See id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Chairman, Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the
Courts).
33 See id.
34 See id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Chairman, Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the
Courts).
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other mediation programs offered by bankruptcy courts.35 The Loss Mitigation
Program typically involved “the following general types of agreements, or a
combination of them: loan modification, loan refinance, forbearance, short
sale, or surrender of the property in full satisfaction.”36
C. Relevant Sections of the Bankruptcy Code
Bankruptcy courts have failed to identify a section of the Bankruptcy Code
that can alleviate the consequences of zombie foreclosures. Bankruptcy courts
need to identify a currently existing power, or Congress needs to amend the
Bankruptcy Code to create a power that provides the debtor and public with
security in bankruptcy plans created under the Bankruptcy Code. A variety of
cases have considered different combinations of the Bankruptcy Code sections
addressed below. Bankruptcy courts need to modify their perspectives and
reach a consensus as to how the Bankruptcy Code does or does not address
zombie foreclosures.
1. Section 1325(a)(5)—Confirmation of Plan
The major debate in case law surrounding § 1325(a)(5)(A)’s use in conjunction with § 1325(a)(5)(C) relates to the definition of “surrender” within the
language of the § 1325(a)(5)(C) and its subsequent effect on the interpretation
of the confirmation of a chapter 13 plan.37 Section 1325(a)(5)(A) states the following: “Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan
if . . . with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan[] the
holder of such claim has accepted the plan . . . .”38 Section 1325(a)(5)(C)
states: “the court shall confirm a plan if . . . with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan . . . the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder . . . .”39
The language in this section lays the groundwork for confirmation of the
plan. This is a key place where bankruptcy courts may rectify zombie foreclo35 See id. at 13–17 (statement of Hon. Martin Glenn, United States Bankruptcy J., Southern District of
New York).
36 Id. at 14 (statement of Hon. Martin Glenn, United States Bankruptcy J., Southern District of New
York) (quotation marks omitted).
37 See In re Rose, 512 B.R. 790, 793–94 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014); Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. CV 311-106, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128412 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2012).
38 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (2012).
39 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added).
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sure issues. Section 1325(a)(5)(C) augments § 1325(a)(5)(A) and addresses the
surrender of all allowed secured claims provided for by the plan because it
provides that “the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such
holder.”40 The Analysis section of this Comment will recommend ways for
bankruptcy courts to interpret §§ 1325(a)(5)(A) and (C) and for Congress to
amend the Bankruptcy Code.
2. Section 362(d)—Automatic Stay
This section of the Comment outlines the relevant conditions under which
creditors can ask the bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay provision. This provision is applicable given the relationship of the automatic stay to
the steps involved in the foreclosure process. As discussed above, only when
the bankruptcy court grants a bank relief from the automatic stay (also discussed as agreeing to lift the stay) can the institution begin to foreclose on the
property at issue. These relevant conditions include the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property under § 362(d)(1)41 and issues arising with the
debtor’s equity in the property and the property’s use in reorganization.42
Additionally subsection (3) of § 362(d) addresses circumstances related to
real property that are grounds for bankruptcy courts to lift the automatic stay.43
Specifically, § 362(d)(3) addresses what a debtor must do in order for the stay
to be lifted for “an act against single asset real estate under subsection (a),” by
a secured creditor with an interest in the property.44 This subsection (3) lays
out a timeline for certain actions relating to the lifting of the automatic stay.45
For the stay to be lifted, the debtor must meet one of two requirements: “(A)
the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable possibility of
being confirmed within a reasonable time; or (B) the debtor has commenced
monthly payments.”46
40

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A)–(B). Section 362(d)(4) addresses the applicability of the automatic stay
if the petition in the case was filed to defraud or avoid a creditor. Section 362(d)(4) specifically outlines the
scenarios that would trigger the clause, “(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, such real
property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; or (B) multiple bankruptcy filing affecting such real property.” This Comment makes the reader aware of subsection 4 to demonstrate that the debtors
involved in zombie foreclosures did not try to defraud the system; they are bona fide, honest debtors. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)–(4).
44 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3).
45 Id.
46 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(A)–(B).
41
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3. Section 1322(b)(9)—Contents of the Plan
Section 1322 contains information about the specifics of the confirmation
plan discussed previously in § 1325(a)(5).47 Section 1322 helps determine what
a plan could require of the creditor after the debtor receives confirmation of a
chapter 13 plan. Specifically, in In re Rose, discussed infra, the court considered subsection (b)(9) and investigated the question of whether vesting under
this section could require a creditor to accept title to the property.48 The language being analyzed states that a “plan may provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or in
any other entity . . . .”49 Subsection (b)(9) is the only part of the Bankruptcy
Code the court used in its analysis.50
4. Section 105—Power of the Court
Section 105 addresses the powers awarded to bankruptcy courts and clarifies things courts can and cannot do.51 Section 105 is particularly important
when examining the challenges created by zombie foreclosures. When considering possible amendments to the Bankruptcy Code or sections that could potentially be read more broadly, bankruptcy courts must remain within the powers specified in this section. In In re Rose and a number of other cases (that do
not necessarily consider § 105 as it relates to zombie foreclosures in particular), § 105 is a broadly interpreted catch-all power.52 The real issues, however,
arise around interpretation of exactly how broad that power should be for
bankruptcy courts.53
When considering zombie foreclosures in bankruptcy, and the need to determine a more equitable resolution for the debtor involved, it is helpful to step
back and consider the role of bankruptcy courts more generally. Bankruptcy
“courts are courts in law and equity”54 and are granted “equitable power”

47

11 U.S.C. § 1322; see 11 U.S.C § 1325(a)(5).
See 512 B.R. 790, 794–95 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
49 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9).
50 Rose, 512 B.R. at 794–95.
51 11 U.S.C. § 105.
52 See 512 B.R. at 795.
53 See id.
54 Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011)
(“Federal courts are courts in law and equity . . . .” (quoting Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distrib. Co.,
166 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1999)) (quotation marks omitted)).
48

MCQUADE GALLEYSPROOFS

2016]

THE ANTIDOTE TO ZOMBIE FORECLOSURES

5/11/2016 11:55 AM

517

through § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.55 This equitable power underlies the
bankruptcy courts and stems from “[t]he nature of equity.”56 Equity is meant to
be a “correction of the law where, by reason of its universality, it is deficient.”57 Thus, “equity is obliged to acknowledge rights not recognized at
law.”58 As zombie foreclosures appear in increasing numbers, bankruptcy
courts need to keep their equitable powers in mind.
D. In re Rose
In re Rose is a typical zombie foreclosure case. The debtors in Rose filed a
chapter 13 petition in December 2012.59 The property at issue was a residence
valued at $30,000, subject to a mortgage of over $78,000 held by the Small
Business Association (the “SBA”).60 As part of their confirmed chapter 13
plan, the Roses surrendered the residence to the SBA, and the court lifted the
automatic stay to enable the SBA to foreclose.61 Over a year later, the SBA
still failed to foreclose.62 In the interim, the property continued to accrue expenses, making the Roses subject to post-petition penalties, including ad valorem taxes and maintenance costs.63 Despite having a confirmed chapter 13
bankruptcy plan that no longer accounted for expenses associated with the
property at issue, the Roses remained liable for the property and related expenses from December 2012 onward because the SBA continuously failed to
initiate the foreclosure process on the Roses’ residence after the court lifted the
automatic stay.64 At this point, to resolve this issue, the Roses asked the court
to allow them to quitclaim the residence to the SBA.65 Despite proper notice,

55 Id. at 735 (quoting Childress v. Middleton Arms, L.P. (In re Middleton Arms, Ltd.), 934 F.2d 723, 724
(6th Cir. 1991)) (quotation marks omitted).
56 See id. (quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. V, at (c. 384 B.C.E.) (citing In re Middleton Arms,
Ltd.), 934 F.2d at 724).
57 Id. (quoting Aristotle 384–322 B.C.E.) (quotation marks omitted).
58 Id. (quoting May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340 (Tenn. 2008)).
59 512 B.R. 790, 792 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
60 Id. at 792–93.
61 Id. at 793.
62 Id.
63 Id. Ad valorem taxes are based on the assessed value of real estate or personal property and are a significant source of income for state and municipal governments. See Definition of ‘Ad Valorem Tax,’
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/advaloremtax.asp; Jeffrey S. Adams, Comment, Rewriting 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(16): The Problems of Delayed Foreclosure and Judicial Activism, 30 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 347 (2014) (discussing challenges with home owners association fees, another post-petition penalty
associated with zombie foreclosures).
64 See In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 793.
65 Id.
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the SBA failed to respond to the Motion or to appear at the March 2014 hearing.66
Specifically the court considered whether the Bankruptcy Code or a Florida
state law allowed the bankruptcy court to compel the lender, or any other secured creditor, “to foreclose on a debtor’s property or accept a quitclaim deed
to the same.”67 The court examined a number of suggestions of possible
sources of the power to compel a secured creditor to complete the foreclosure
process.68 The court explored §§ 1325(a)(5)(C), 1322(b)(9), and 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code at length.69 The court concluded that it did not have the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to transfer the real property; the court held,
however, that state law in Florida created an opportunity for the transfer if the
creditor continued to fail to respond or take action.70
II. ANALYSIS
A. Solutions Within the Existing Bankruptcy Code
While the Rose court and others attempted to answer the question of zombie foreclosures based on traditional interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code,
zombie foreclosures offer a new kind of issue within bankruptcy. After considering the approach the court took in Rose, this Comment argues how the Rose
court and a few others misinterpreted the Bankruptcy Code as it applies to
zombie foreclosures. Courts have used different Bankruptcy Code sections to
analyze the zombie foreclosure issue.71
The Bankruptcy Code has the potential to resolve zombie foreclosures and
mitigate a portion of the public nuisance challenge facing communities across
the United States. Therefore, it is critical that bankruptcy courts recognize the
bigger picture surrounding zombie foreclosures and readjust their analyses.

66

See id. at 792.
Id. at 793.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 793–95.
70 See id. at 798.
71 See, e.g., id. at 793–94; Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Me.
2011), aff’d, 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011), aff’d, 706 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2013); Arsenault v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 627, 631–32 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, Arsenault v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 311-106, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128412 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2012); Pratt
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006).
67

MCQUADE GALLEYSPROOFS

2016]

THE ANTIDOTE TO ZOMBIE FORECLOSURES

5/11/2016 11:55 AM

519

1. Section 1325(a)(5)(C)
A number of cases have explored the limitations of surrender under
§ 1325(a)(5)(C).72 Unfortunately, the manner in which courts currently interpret surrender leads to a difficult reality for most debtors in bankruptcy. The
debtor follows the bankruptcy plan and often gives up all rights to the property
but continues to be responsible for a number of liabilities associated with the
property.
The court in Rose explored § 1325(a)(5)(C) as a possible code provision
that could be used to allow the Roses to quitclaim the title to their property to
the SBA.73 The automatic stay needs to be lifted for a creditor to foreclose.74
However, the debtors in Rose argued that once the stay is lifted, the creditor is
compelled to take control of the property.75 It is important to determine the definition and scope of “surrender” under § 1325(a)(5)(C) for such a proposition.
If the act of surrender does compel a creditor to foreclose, the creditor would
violate the automatic stay if it failed to follow through with foreclosure proceedings.76 The court determined, based on the opinions of In re Arsenault and
other previous case law, that “surrender” under § 1325(a)(5)(C) does not create
a requirement for the creditor to do something with the surrendered property.77
Before addressing the way the case law has treated the ramifications of surrender for creditors, the opinion in Rose cited to circuit case law that directly addressed the definition of “surrender.”78 “Surrender” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore courts look to case law to determine its
interpretation.79 The court in Rose accurately stated that “‘[s]urrender’ has
been described as the relinquishment of all rights in property, including the
right to possess the collateral.”80 Despite this relinquishment, other case law
has held that “there is no corresponding requirement that the lender . . . do any-

72

See, e.g., In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 793–94.
See id.
74 Id. at 793.
75 See id.
76 See 456 B.R. at 631–32; see also Brown v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. (In re Brown), 477 B.R. 915,
917–18 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
77 In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 794 (citing 456 B.R. 627).
78 See id. at 793 (citing IRS v. White (In re White), 487 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2007); 8 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.06[4] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2005)).
79 See In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 793 (citing In re White, 487 F.3d at 205; 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 78.
80 512 B.R. at 793 (citing In re White, 487 F.3d at 205 (4th Cir. 2007); 8 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra
note 78.
73
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thing with the property.”81 The Rose opinion relied on a number of cases to
reach this conclusion.82
When considering each case the Rose opinion relied on, there are significant differences between the cases and the behaviors of the creditors in each
case compared to Rose that arguably warrant different treatment under the
Bankruptcy Code. In each case, these key differences appear to have been
overlooked or discounted by the bankruptcy court judge. For the proposition
that there is no corresponding requirement on the lender to do anything with
the surrendered property, Rose cited a First Circuit opinion of a bankruptcy
court case, Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt).83 Pratt
presented a significantly different set of facts surrounding the surrender of the
asset in question.84 In this chapter 7 case, converted from a previous chapter 13
case, the Pratts notified the creditor under § 521(a)(2)(A) that they would “surrender” a car “by ceding possession in lieu of reaffirming their prepetition loan
obligation to GMAC.”85 After the court lifted the automatic stay, unlike the
SBA in Rose, over the course of the chapter 7 proceeding GMAC was in contact with the Pratts and made it clear that they would not repossess or “release
its lien unless and until the outstanding loan balance was paid in full.”86 On
appeal, the Pratts argued that GMAC “effectively negated their right to ‘surrender,’” by failing to repossess or release the lien.87 However, the court disagreed.88
Pratt interpreted surrender to signify the debtor making the collateral available to the creditor, but in no way interpreted § 521 to “remotely suggest[]”
that there is any action required on the part of the creditor.89 Under § 521(a)(2),
the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor three distinct options to address lien
avoidance or modification.90 The specific option that most directly relates to
81

In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 793–94 (citing Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d
14, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Arsenault, 456 B.R. 627; Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442
B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011), aff’d, 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011), aff’d, 706 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2013)).
82 See 512 B.R. at 793–94 (citing In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Arsenault, 456
B.R. 627; In re Canning, 442 B.R. 165.
83 See In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 793 (citing In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 18–19).
84 Compare 462 F.3d at 16–17, with In re Rose, 512 B.R. 790 .
85 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 16; see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2012).
86 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 16.
87 Id. at 17.
88 See id. at 19.
89 See id. (“[S]uch a reading would be at odds with well-established law that a creditor’s decision whether to foreclose on and/or repossess collateral is purely voluntary and discretionary.”).
90 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2); In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 17.
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the discussion in Rose and other zombie foreclosures is the right to surrender.
The court in Pratt expressly acknowledged treating the options given to the
debtor carefully with an eye to fairness “[d]ue to the importance of the Code’s
‘fresh start’ policy.”91 The court agreed with GMAC’s argument, however, that
the “surrender did not require that it repossess the vehicle if GMAC deemed
such repossession cost ineffective.”92
The facts in Pratt surrounding the foreclosure process differ significantly
from the foreclosure process in Rose. Due to GMAC’s responses to the surrender by the Pratts, the case did not account for the silent acceptance that the
SBA appears to offer to the surrender of the property in Rose. Given this prominent difference in the facts, bankruptcy courts should not apply Pratt in zombie foreclosure cases. The behavior by the SBA and GMAC is distinguishable
because debtors are often unaware that creditors failed to initiate foreclosure
after the court lifted the automatic stay for zombie foreclosures.93
Similarly, there are important differences between the typical zombie foreclosure, illustrated in Rose, and another case that the court cited in support for
its interpretation of “surrender” under § 1325(a)(5)(C), Canning v. Beneficial
Maine, Inc. (In re Canning).94 Similar to Pratt, this case involved a fact pattern
that addresses a possible violation of the discharge injunction in chapter 7 (later converted to a chapter 13) bankruptcy case.95 However, the bankruptcy court
distinguished Canning from Pratt.96 Canning is a case involving real property,
as opposed to the “worthless” car in Pratt.97 Similar to the Pratt decision, the
court in Canning concluded that § 521(a)(2) does not require a creditor to take
action with respect to surrendered property.98 Again, however, this case had a
significant amount of communication between the creditor and the debtor.99
91 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 18 (citing Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 398
(1st Cir. 2002); Whitehouse v. LaRoche, 277 F.3d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 2002)).
92 In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 19–20 (finding nevertheless that GMAC’s “refusal to release its valueless lien
so that the vehicle could be junked—though presumably not made in bad faith—was ‘coercive’ in its effect,
and thus willfully violated the discharge injunction”).
93 See Fitzgerald, supra note 5 (demonstrating how an individual in bankruptcy is often blind-sided by a
zombie foreclosure and the ways that the zombie foreclosure has significant repercussions on an individual’s
livelihood); see also Christie, supra note 29.
94 442 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011), aff’d, 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011), aff’d, 706 F.3d 64 (1st
Cir. 2013).
95 See id. at 169.
96 See id. at 171–72.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 172.
99 See id. at 167–69.
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Unlike debtors in many zombie foreclosure cases, the debtors in Canning were
aware that the creditor never began the foreclosure process on the property.100
While the court in Rose relies on Pratt and Canning because they analyzed
the term “surrender,” the court acknowledged that the cases did not deal with
zombie foreclosures.101 Neither Pratt nor Canning address the use of the term
“surrender” in § 1325(a)(5)(C). Although their analysis illustrates the way
many bankruptcy courts interpret the term “surrender,” bankruptcy courts
should rely on cases that deal with similar facts to zombie foreclosure cases,
like Rose.
The final case that the Rose opinion relied on was Arsenault v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault).102 Specifically, the bankruptcy court in Arsenault explored the limitations of § 1325(a)(5)(C) in relation to a set of facts
similar to many other zombie foreclosure properties across the United
States.103 In Arsenault, the debtors filed a chapter 13 plan that provided for real
property in Florida to “be surrendered ‘in full satisfaction’ of Chase’s
claim.”104 The court granted JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s motion to dismiss
the complaint filed by Mr. and Mrs. Arsenault.105 The Arsenaults argued
Chase’s failure to transfer the property out of the Arsenaults’ name, pursuant to
their chapter 13 confirmed plan, was “a veiled attempt to collect a debt in violation of the automatic stay and a violation of the confirmation order.”106 However, the court disagreed.107
The court in Arsenault found that while the debtors surrendered the property under § 1325(a)(5)(C), the surrender did not trigger an action by the creditor.108 Specifically, the court stated that “surrender does not obligate” the credi-

100 See id. at 167–68, 172 (holding overall that the creditor violated the discharge injunction by attempting
to collect payment from the Cannings, but not by the creditor’s failure to foreclose).
101 Compare 462 F.3d 14, 17–20 (1st Cir. 2006), and In re Canning, 442 B.R. 165, with In re Rose, 512
B.R. 790 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
102 456 B.R. 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 311106, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128412 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2012); see In re Rose, 512 B.R. 790, 793–94 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 2014).
103 See id. at 630 (stating that “surrender” does not obligate the creditor to transfer title out of the debtor’s
name, specifically “surrender of encumbered property leaves the secured creditor in control of the exercise of
its remedies, a plan cannot require a secured creditor to accept a surrender of property”).
104 Id. at 628.
105 Id. at 627–28.
106 Id. at 628.
107 Id. at 630.
108 See id. (discussing the obligations of § 1325(a)(5)(C) for debtors and creditors at length).
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tor to take any sort of action under the property.109 This holding is the same as
the holdings of other cases; this is the first time, however, that such a holding
expressly refused to use the powers under § 105.110 While it is true that confirmation of a plan by surrender of the property does not obligate a creditor to
affirmatively act, the plan was confirmed and accepted by all parties including
the creditor.111 It is an accepted premise that confirmation makes the plan binding on all parties. Therefore, a simple amendment to the language of § 1325(a)
should be considered to clarify that such confirmation requires creditors to follow through on any obligations a debtor’s plan assigned to the creditor regarding any real property.
Importantly, while Arsenault and Rose seem to suggest to the public that a
court has never held that a surrender under § 1325(a)(5)(C) can be used to allow the lender to be responsible for the collateral without its consent, this is not
actually the case.112 In the opinion in Rose, the court dismissed an unpublished
case in the Eastern District of North Carolina bankruptcy court, In re Perry, as
“pragmatic . . . [but] of limited precedential value.”113 This case “permitted
Chapter 13 debtors to surrender property by quitclaim deed to a mortgage
lender absent consent.”114 While Perry is an unpublished case and therefore the
legal basis for the judges’ conclusions are not specified, this case appears to be
similar to a typical zombie foreclosure case, unlike some of the case law relied
on by Rose and Arsenault. In particular, Perry involved a chapter 13 debtor,
and the lender did not respond or defend itself against the motion by the debtor
to “surrender property by quitclaim deed.”115 Given the similarities, it may
have been beneficial for the court in Rose to acknowledge the possibility of
two different approaches to the ability of debtors to surrender by quitclaim
deed under § 1325(a)(5)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code, as suggested by the unpublished case law.

109

Id. at 629.
See id. at 631; see also Brown v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. (In re Brown), 477 B.R. 915, 917–18
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
111 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012).
112 See 512 B.R. 790, 794 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
113 Id.
114 Id. (citing In re Perry, No. 12-01633-8-RDD, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4731, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 9,
2012)).
115 Id.
110
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2. Section 1322(b)(9)
In Rose, the court specifically addressed the theory that § 1322(b)(9) required a lender to accept title to a property.116 The court declined to follow the
holding from In re Rosa based on the arguments that such required acceptance
“could impair a lender’s rights in the collateral . . . and contravene state property law.”117 Rosa was a typical zombie foreclosure case, in which the debtor
suffered continuing responsibility for Home Owners Association (HOA) dues
for a property after it had been surrendered.118 Within her confirmed chapter 13
bankruptcy plan, Rosa surrendered the real property in question under the plan
confirmation requirements outlined in § 1325(a)(5)(C).119 Similar to the other
case law, the court in Rosa acknowledged, “surrender does not transfer ownership of the surrendered property,” and thus, surrender was not enough to “cut
off” liability for HOA dues.120 However, the court in Rosa ruled in favor of the
debtor that under § 1322(b)(9), title to the property in question vested in the
creditor.121 Ms. Rosa included a “nonstandard provision” within her plan under
chapter 13 that stated the following:
All collateral surrendered for Class 3 claims is surrendered in full satisfaction of the underlying claim. Pursuant to §§ 1322(b)(8) and (9),
title to the property . . . shall vest in City National Bank/OCWEN
Loan Service upon confirmation, and the Confirmation Order shall
constitute a deed of conveyance of the property when recorded at the
Bureau of Conveyances. All secured claims secured by the Debtor’s
property in Ewa Beach will be paid by surrender of the collateral and
foreclosure of the security interests.122

The Court in Rosa disagreed with the Trustee’s objection that such a provision
does not conform to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.123 The court’s
analysis focused on § 1322(b)(9) and the fact that the creditor did not object to
Ms. Rosa’s plan.124 In § 1322(b)(9) “vesting” does not have the same meaning
as “surrender,” and “[t]he plain meaning of ‘vesting’ includes a present trans-

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

See id. at 794–95.
Id. at 795.
See 495 B.R. 522, 523 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2013).
See id.
Id.
See id. at 524.
Id. at 523.
See id. at 523–24.
Id. at 524.
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fer of ownership.”125 Given this significant difference in the terms,
§ 1322(b)(9) allows the plan to include the nonstandard provision.126 Such a
provision is confirmable under § 1325(a)(5)(A), and therefore, according to a
strong precedent in the courts, the creditor’s failure to object to the confirmation plan can be construed as acceptance of the plan.127
The Rose court rejected the argument in Rosa, explaining that the debtor
and creditor would not be subject to the same requirements under “vesting of
property of the estate.”128 The exact language of the provision, however, states
in relevant part that the vesting of the property is provided for, “on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or in any other entity.”129 “Entity” is defined under § 101(15) as “person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and
United States trustee.”130 Given this definition, it is clear that the vesting was
meant to apply to others besides the debtor, and therefore it should be similarly
applied to the creditor. While the court’s concerns in Rose are valid, given
§ 1322(b)(2), the court should have given Rosa’s holding more consideration.131
Since Rose a number of bankruptcy courts have addressed the meaning of
“vesting” under § 1322(b)(9) and how it applies to zombie foreclosures. Similar to the different approaches illustrated by Rose and Rosa, bankruptcy courts
have followed two different schools of thought. All of the courts have dealt
with whether or not “vesting” can occur over the objection of a creditor. One
body of case law has held that even with the option of vesting under

125 Id. (focusing on the fact that Congress chose to use the term “vesting” as opposed to “surrender” in
§ 1322(b)(9)).
126 See id.
127 See id. (“In most instances, failure to object translates into acceptance of the plan by the secured creditor.” (quoting Andrews v. Loheit (In re Andrews), 49 F.3d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1995))) (“The general rule is
that the acceptance of the plan by a secured creditor can be inferred by the absence of a timely objection.”
(quoting In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1413 (3d Cir. 1989))) (“The case law makes clear that if the holder of
an allowed secured claim provided for by a plan fails to object to confirmation of the plan, Section
1325(a)(5)(A) is satisfied . . . .” (quoting In re James, 260 B.R. 498, 503 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001))). The court
additionally qualified that the creditor needed appropriate notice of the potential plan to have ample opportunity to object. Id. at 524–25; see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 78, at ¶ 1327.02 (“A secured creditor may be bound by a plan provision that vests title to property in that creditor, which may be useful when
the creditor refuses to foreclose, subjecting the debtor to ongoing expenses for a property the debtor does not
wish to own.” (citing In re Rosa, 495 B.R. 522)).
128 See In re Rose, 512 B.R. 790, 795 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
129 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9) (2012) (emphasis added).
130 11 U.S.C. § 101(15).
131 Compare In re Rose, 512 B.R. at 795, with In re Rosa, 495 B.R. 522.
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§ 1322(b)(9) “forced vesting . . . over the [that] lender’s objection is inconsistent with the mandatory provisions of § 1325(a)(5).132
Other decisions in bankruptcy courts have held the opposite. In re Sagendorph held “‘vesting of property’ in § 1322(b)(9) and ‘surrender the property’
in § 1325(a)(5)(C) are different and mean different things. . . . These provisions are not in conflict.”133 The court stated surrender “is a preliminary step in
the process of transferring title.”134 The court goes on to hold that even in light
of state law that does not support forced vesting, “[t]he paramount federal interest” of “the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code” out weighs state
law.135 The court allowed the property to vest over a creditor’s objection. Other
bankruptcy courts have also held that property can vest over the creditor’s objection.136
The courts need to work together to clarify the inconsistencies within the
case law. Arguably, bankruptcy courts that have held forced vesting is not allowable are aware and not entirely comfortable with the position that debtors
are left in as a result of such decision.137 In Weller, Judge Boroff acknowledged that “[t]he Court is troubled by the result for these Debtors, for similarly
situated debtors and for the communities that have suffered, and continue to
suffer, as a result of abandoned properties in the aftermath of the real estate
downturn. . . .” and that “the Debtors have been left in limbo by [the Creditor’s] failure to act.” In this case, while the court acknowledged the hardship of
the debtor, it was concerned that a policy of forced vesting would cause lenders to make home mortgage loans less frequently or with more costs associated
with them.138 Other case law recognized the inherent unfairness to the debtor
through the current interpretation of the provision.139 However, the court in
Weller stated that “such competing considerations is the province of legislative

132 In re Weller, No. 12-40418, 2016 WL 164645, at *4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016); see also In re Watt, 520
B.R. 834, 840 (Bankr. D. Or. 2014), vacated, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Watt (In re Watt), No. 3:14-cv-02051AA, 2015 WL 1879680 (D. Or. 2015); In re Williams, 542 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015); In re Sherwood,
No. 15-10637 (JLG), 2016 WL 355520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Tosi, No. 13-14017-FJB, 2016 WL
859034 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016).
133 No. 14-41675-MSH, 2015 WL 3867955, at *4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015).
134 Id.
135 Id. at *4–5.
136 See In re Stewart, No. 13-40709, 2015 WL 5138196 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2015); In re Zair, 535 B.R. 15
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y 2015).
137 In re Weller, 2016 WL 164645, at *4.
138 Id.
139 See In re Watt, 520 B.R. at 840.
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and not judicial bodies . . . .”140 Therefore, this inconsistency demonstrates the
need for clarification to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to give debtor’s
and bankruptcy courts clear guidance on how §1322(b)(9) interacts with
§ 1325(a)(5)(C).
3. Section 105
Rose held that § 105(a) does not allow the court “to alter the substantive
rights of the parties.”141 The opinion acknowledged that although this provisional “catch-all” power has been used to fashion “relief . . . in a wide variety
of situations” the court cannot allow it to be used “to permit a debtor to transfer
property to its mortgage lender by fiat.”142 Specifically, the court in Rose focused on the fact that no previous case law has construed § 105 powers to allow such a transfer to occur, and the court stated it would “not be the first.”143
The court in Rose should have explored § 105 powers in more detail with respect to zombie foreclosures based on a number of factors including that zombie foreclosures represent a fairly new concept, and zombie foreclosure cases
are just beginning to represent a notable portion of the bankruptcy court case
docket.
In Arsenault, the court further held that the confirmation order for the debtors’ chapter 13 plan did not create a binding contract between the parties because the act of “surrender” did not compel Chase Bank to affirmatively take
title on the property.144 While § 105 grants the bankruptcy court considerable
powers, the bankruptcy court declined to exercise any of those powers based
on the facts of the case, and thus based on the facts of zombie foreclosures.145
While the court in Arsenault declined to use § 105 powers, the court offered the following analysis:
Debtors argue Chase’s inactions impede Debtors’ ability to a fresh
start thereby violating the fresh start concept of the Bankruptcy Code.

140

In re Weller, 2016 WL 164645, at *4.
512 B.R. 790, 795 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014) (citing Internal Revenue Serv. v. Levy (In re Landbank
Equity Corp.), 973 F.2d 265, 271 (4th Cir. 1992)).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 456 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d, Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV
311-106, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128412 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2012).
145 See id. at 631 (declining to use the powers because the Bankruptcy Code “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a
roving commission to do equity”)
141
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However, “[]in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to
strike a balance among the competing interests of debtors, creditors
and the government.” Debtors’ fresh start is not the only interest addressed in the Bankruptcy Code. Under the Code’s structure, debtors
are not absolved of all incidents of ownership. Chase is prevented
from pursuing Debtors in personam for this debt, but given these
facts, Chase is not required to absolve Debtors of truly third party obligations that are incidents of property ownership. Nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code requires Chase to transfer title.146

Specifically, the court cited the Canning case that was discussed in Rose when
considering § 1325(a)(5)(C) and the definition of surrender.147 Arsenault focused on the portion of the Canning opinion that explained the Bankruptcy
Code does not require a creditor “to assume ownership or take possession of
collateral,” even if in the Cannings’ case the creditor’s “chosen course of action, or inaction, did not make things easy for the Cannings.”148 The court in
Arsenault used the Canning court’s analysis of § 1325(a)(5)(C) as the basis for
the court in Arsenault declining “to exercise any § 105 power.”149
Bankruptcy courts need to consider a way to use § 105 powers in a way
that balances all of the interests involved in the unique situations that have led
to the proliferation of zombie foreclosures. Despite the analysis offered to support the court’s conclusions in Arsenault, the court got the “balance among the
competing interests of debtors, creditors and the government” wrong.150 The
cases the court relied on, such as Canning, were about significantly different
sets of facts and circumstances. In Canning, the creditor and debtor were in
contact, and the court wanted to protect the creditor’s interest to allow the
property to increase in value with the passage of time.151 On these facts, the
court in Canning balanced the factors based on a fairness question that dealt
with significantly different concerns than those being balanced in Arsenault
and other zombie foreclosures. The decision in Arsenault spoke about balancing interests, but it failed to offer any consideration of the broad effects these
situations have on communities and individuals nationwide. Bankruptcy courts
should consider the broad effects these situations have on communities and in146 Id. at 631 (citing United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1986); Canning v. Beneficial
Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011), aff’d, 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011),
aff’d, 706 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2013)).
147 See 442 B.R. at 171–72.
148 Id. at 172.
149 456 B.R. at 631.
150 Id.
151 See 442 B.R. at 171–72.
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dividuals when addressing zombie foreclosures. The community interest is not
implicated in the cases that the Arsenault court considered when determining
its rationale for choosing not to use § 105 powers.
Specifically, there is little in the legislative history that addresses zombie
foreclosures because legislatures did not anticipate it when the Bankruptcy
Code was created.152 There have been discussions considering the possibility
of amending the Bankruptcy Code within congressional committee and subcommittee hearings that addressed the effects of the mortgage foreclosure crisis.153 Specifically, the hearings considered amendments to § 105 to more
clearly allow bankruptcy court judges the flexibility that they need to alleviate
the negative results of the foreclosure crisis.154 These suggestions have been
raised by individuals testifying in front of such committees and members of the
committees and subcommittees. The Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary acknowledged that there was discussion to “generate such a provision on
a bipartisan basis” being explored by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.155
4. The Last Resort
If all of the above arguments do not apply in a certain case, there is one remaining option that bankruptcy courts should consider suggesting to debtors.
As Rose illustrates, bankruptcy courts are not necessarily comfortable leaving
debtors in the trying positions created in association with zombie foreclosures.156 This discomfort is recognizable when the court acknowledged that the
debtors had done everything required of them under their bankruptcy plan.157
In Rose, the court granted part of the debtors’ claim to allow the debtors a
chance to succeed outside the bankruptcy court within state law.158 Unfortunately, being uncomfortable with an outcome does not change the way a judge
interprets the Bankruptcy Code in most situations.

152 See Conlin, supra note 3 (“Banks used to almost always follow through with foreclosures, either repossessing a house outright . . . or putting it up for auction at a sheriff’s sale. . . . That has changed since the
housing crash.”).
153 See Mandatory Mediation Programs, supra note 31, at 20 (statement of John Rao, Attorney, National
Consumer Law Center).
154 See id.
155 Id. (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Chairman, Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts).
156 See, e.g., 512 B.R. 790, 793 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
157 See id.
158 See id. at 797–98.
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In a scenario where the court offers no relief to the debtor, the debtor can
re-file for bankruptcy. However, this is not an ideal scenario, given that many
zombie foreclosures involve significant lag times from when bankruptcy plans
are completed to when formal adversarial actions are commenced in court.
Many chapter 13 debtors would likely approach the end of the limitations for
re-filing. Under § 1328(f)(2), a debtor will be able to file another chapter 13
petition after two years have passed since the completion of the previous
case.159 While re-filing for bankruptcy is burdensome, it may be the only
method available to find a way through a zombie foreclosure.
B. Other Resolutions to the Zombie Foreclosure Crisis
The quickest and most direct route to addressing zombie foreclosures in
bankruptcy is to follow the holding in Rosa. By accepting Rosa’s holding,
courts should require debtors to include the “nonstandard provision” language
in every bankruptcy plan to avoid zombie foreclosures in the future.160 This
possible solution to address zombie foreclosure cases is particularly promising
because it does not require an actual amendment to the Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, legislative action will not be required. This new approach would only require an alteration in practice for bankruptcy attorneys when there is a
concern that a property being surrendered within a plan will be left “in limbo”
by the creditor.
Similarly, while amending the Bankruptcy Code may sound like a more
radical step, the possibility of amending the Bankruptcy Code in light of the
foreclosure crisis is not an entirely new suggestion. Since the Bankruptcy Code
was last amended in 2005, there have been Congressional hearings debating
whether the foreclosure crisis would require amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code.161 While this particular movement for Bankruptcy Code reform
stemmed from a rejected portion of the federal Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”),162 it represents an acknowledgment that amending the Code to ad159

11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(2) (2012).
See 495 B.R. 522, 523 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2013).
161 See The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy Reform?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
[hereinafter The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis].
162 The federal TARP was created in 2008 to “combat” the recent recession and subsequently related consequences. The Obama administration through the Treasury created two key programs under the TARP legislation, including Making Home Affordable and the Hardest Hit Fund, in an attempt to address the housing crisis
that accompanied the financial crisis. See Financial Stability, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (last visited Feb. 19,
2016), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx. There are more Congressional
160
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dress the issue of the 2008 recession is something Congress has and should
consider.163
The Bankruptcy Code needs changes to the specific language within the
sections discussed above to codify the new approach courts should take to address zombie foreclosures. The most straightforward way to clarify issues that
arise with zombie foreclosures could be to define “surrender” within the definitional section of the Bankruptcy Code, § 101.164 The current failure to provide
a definition for the term is a gap in the Bankruptcy Code that needs to be addressed. Leaving it to individual courts to interpret such a significant term allows for the possibility of conflicting interpretation and unclear guidance for
debtors in future bankruptcy proceedings. Debtors deserve to have clearer
guidance on what their “surrender” associated with § 1325(a)(5)(C) and other
Bankruptcy Code sections represents. By adding a definition for the term “surrender,” the Bankruptcy Code can clearly recognize the parameters of “surrender” for both the debtor and a secured creditor during plan confirmation.
Additionally, Congress needs to consider the requirements of the plan confirmation, § 1325(a)(5)(C). This Comment suggests that there is a way to include language within confirmation plans that clarifies requirements to ensure
that secured creditors do not continue to sit on various properties without foreclosing. For example, § 1325(a)(5)(A)165 in connection with § 1327166 clarifies
that confirmed plans are binding on debtors and creditors alike.167 If additional
language was added to the Bankruptcy Code that clarified the obligations secured creditors had toward surrendered properties, it could keep an equitable
balance of interests between creditors and debtors. Such additional language
would place all of the parties on notice that confirmation of a plan including
the surrender of collateral to the creditor has a binding effect on both parties.
Therefore, secured creditors would plan accordingly and be prepared to ques-

complaints about the effectiveness of the TARP programs and other related programs that were meant to address the housing foreclosure crisis. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 55-737, EVALUATING PROGRESS ON TARP
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS (2010). This report specifically articulates issues surrounding bankruptcy in connection with the Panel’s discussion of foreclosure mitigation and recent changes to previously
announced programs. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 55-737, EVALUATING PROGRESS ON TARP FORECLOSURE
MITIGATION PROGRAMS 13–14 (2010) (applauding the U.S. Treasury’s new guidance for outreach requiring
program servicers to consider bankrupt individuals for the programs).
163 See The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 161.
164 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101.
165 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A).
166 11 U.S.C. § 1327.
167 See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a).
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tion the plan if such creditors have no bona fide interest in ever initiating foreclosure or taking action with property.
One recommendation for such language to amend the Bankruptcy Code
calls for the addition of a clause into § 1325, to further clarify the binding nature of plan confirmation, and demonstrate that interpreting § 1325 as binding,
does not go against other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as
§ 1322(b)(2).168 The suggested change to the language of § 1325(a) adds a subsection (10) that would firmly require creditors to fulfill obligations they accepted by failing to object to confirmation of a plan.169
In particular, clarifying the requirements under § 1325 includes obligations
that come due in the aftermath of the lifting of the automatic stay such as to
commence foreclosure proceedings. The language could be written in a similar
manner to that of some of the other provisions within § 1325(a). The amendment, so as not to alter a party’s rights under the provisions,170 would include
“the acceptance of the plan by the creditor by failing to object to the plan as
proposed by the debtor.”
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code may be able to incentivize a secured
creditor to foreclose in a timely fashion by including time-sensitive lien stripping clauses in confirmation plans. Such clauses would apply if creditors fail to
act in a timely fashion to transfer title once a debtor has discharged his or her
interest in a property or, in the alternative, made it clear to the debtor that they
will not act on the property. Such language puts creditors and debtors on notice
of the situation, balances differing party interests, and protects the community
from zombie foreclosures.
C. Public Policy Considerations
Public policy, as the term suggests, is meant to look at the broader picture
of the community in which the law would be enacted and consider the value
the new law presents for the community.171 Public policy concerns arise when
considering how bankruptcy courts currently approach zombie foreclosures.
There is a strong public policy rationale for finding a way to utilize § 105 pow168

See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1327.
170 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
171 See WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 8 (Shirelle Phelps & Jeffrey Lehman eds., 2d ed.
2005) (defining “policy”); WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 8 (Shirelle Phelps & Jeffrey Lehman
eds., 2d ed. 2005) (defining “public policy”).
169
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ers to remove zombie foreclosures from the landscape of communities
throughout the country.172
The number of Congressional subcommittees that have directly and indirectly addressed the concerns for communities nationwide suffering from “the
blight of foreclosed properties,” illustrates the importance of the discussion
that is ongoing around the mortgage financial crisis.173 Additionally, in some
of these hearing reports, there is a real emphasis on holding banks accountable.174 Through accountability and transparency efforts, Congress hopes to
“begin to fix those unscrupulous lending practices that took place and wrongful
foreclosures with the public interest as our core principle.”175 Bankruptcy
courts would be able to use the Bankruptcy Code to create a more robust level
of accountability and to alleviate the effects of the foreclosure crisis because of
legislators’ efforts to amend the Bankruptcy Code.
New legislation proposed by New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, originally in fall 2014, followed by a revised version in 2015 through
2016, illustrates the current and significant public policy concerns relating to
zombie properties.176 The title of the proposed program bill, the Abandoned
Property Neighborhood Relief Act, suggests the significant public policy underpinnings of the bill.177 The bill proposes to introduce a number of provisions to “address the growing statewide problem of so-called ‘zombie properties.’”178 Specifically, the Abandoned Property Neighborhood Relief Act will
introduce a number of provisions to help debtors and their communities to deal
with zombie foreclosure properties. The provisions will serve to clarify homeowner’s rights in their property, as well as the obligations required of banks to
avoid zombie foreclosures. While the bill is meant to help homeowners, it is
172

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 105.
Saving Our Neighborhoods, supra note 8.
174 See Helping Homeowners Harmed by Foreclosures: Ensuring Accountability and Transparency in
Foreclosure Reviews: Hearing Before the Hous., Transp. & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2013).
175 Helping Homeowners Harmed by Foreclosures: Ensuring Accountability and Transparency in Foreclosure Reviews: Hearing Before the Hous., Transp. & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Robert Menendez, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Hous.,
Transp. & Cmty. Dev.).
176 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eric T. Schneiderman, supra note 9; see also Fahey, supra note 6.
177 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eric T. Schneiderman, supra note 9.
178 Id.; see also Ben Lane, New York Doubling Down in Fight Against Zombie Foreclosures: Attorney
General Announces New Legislation to Address ‘Growing Problems,’ HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/print/32962-new-york-doubling-down-in-fight-against-zombieforeclosures.
173
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limited by the current scope of the definition of individuals and homes that
contribute to zombie foreclosures.179 The bill is a strong first step by New
York to address the zombie foreclosure crisis, but still has a long way to go before it can impact debtors and communities.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy courts need to reconsider their stance on zombie foreclosures.
The case law is still developing on this front, and courts need to consciously
decide how zombie foreclosure cases should be addressed under the Bankruptcy Code. Over time, zombie foreclosures will likely become a more developed
portion of bankruptcy case law. If bankruptcy courts act soon, then they can
avoid further inconsistent case law around zombie foreclosures, like the inconsistent holdings concerning § 1322(b)(9).180
This Comment suggests that there are a number of possible ways to address
zombie foreclosures with slight additions to the language of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 1325(a)(5)(A) needs to be modified to create plans with binding
time limits on secured creditors. Or, in lieu of binding time limits, amendments
should clarify that there are corresponding obligations that fall to a creditor depending on the details of the plan and the actions associated with the case. This
slight change would allow the Bankruptcy Code to allow for the courts and
debtors to have recourse when dealing with potential zombie foreclosures.
Changing the way bankruptcy courts interpret and apply the Bankruptcy
Code to certain cases is consistent with the tenets of bankruptcy law. Creditors
would still be able to receive fair, equitable treatment in bankruptcy cases. A
secured creditor could agree to a debtor’s plan; if the creditor rejects the debtor’s plan, then it could become an unsecured creditor.181 By giving the creditors a choice to become an unsecured creditor with no priority, the creditor still
receives the same funds as if they had remained a secured creditor with no intention to actually foreclose. Also, even if the court considers such a change to
be detrimental to the secured creditor with first priority, the court needs to
think beyond the first priority position. For many homes there are potentially
179

See id.
See, e.g., In re Watt, 520 B.R. 834, 840 (Bankr. D. Or. 2014), vacated, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Watt
(In re Watt), No. 3:14-cv-02051-AA, 2015 WL 1879680 (D. Or. 2015); In re Zair, 535 B.R. 15 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2015).
181 If this were considered as a possible solution, there are also a number of other Bankruptcy Code provisions that need to be considered that deal with a creditor’s right to appear in front of the court and be heard on
an issue, such as 11 U.S.C. § 1109.
180
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multiple mortgages and secured creditors in play. Therefore, such a policy
would allow other secured creditors to receive a more equitable remedy (at the
expense of the secured creditor who lost priority). Bankruptcy courts have
broad discretion and in many ways present the possible resolution to challenges currently facing debtors, creditors, and communities across the country.
By using the rationale offered in this Comment, bankruptcy courts will be
able to offer debtors relief. Additionally, not all of the methods above necessarily require any legislative action, so courts could immediately grant debtors
relief as more zombie foreclosure cases arise. The methods discussed are not
meant to present radical change. However, they are meant to encourage the
bankruptcy courts to appropriately adapt to the present realities of the mortgage foreclosure crisis to better help American communities and individuals
finally recover and start anew.
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